Division and Reunion               1829 — 1889        BY  WOODROW WILSON,   PH.D.,  LL.D.      First Edition,  March 1893.    (Revised)  April 1900.

CHAPTER IX. THE  CIVIL  WAR   (1861-1865). A  Period  of  Hesitation  (1861). (Page  214)       Secession  and  Civil  War.      On January 29,  1861,  after the withdrawal of the southern members  had given the Republicans  a majority in the Senate,  it passed the bill  which was to admit Kansas to the Union  under her latest free constitution;  the Territories of  Nevada, Colorado, and Dakota were organized,  without mention of slavery;  and a new Tariff Act,  which had passed the House the previous winter,  passed the Senate,  in aid of the now embarrassed  finances of the government.   But  on the subject of most pressing exigency  every proposal failed. Compromise measures without number  were brought forward,  but nothing was agreed upon.  A Peace Congress,  made up of delegates from all  but the seceding States,  met,  at the suggestion of Virginia,  and proposed acts of accommodation;  a senatorial committee joined it  in advocating the extension of the Missouri compromise line  to the Pacific,  the positive establishment of slavery  by Congress  to the south of that line,  and compensation from the federal Treasury  for fugitive slaves rescued after arrest.  Even Mr. Seward,  the Republican leader in Congress,  was willing to concede some of the chief points of Republican policy  with regard to Slavery  in the Territories  for the sake of conciliation.  But  nothing was done;  everything was left to the next administration. Period  of  Hesitation.   (Page  215)      Policy had to carry the people with it;  had to await the awakening of the national idea  into full consciousness;  and this first pause of doubt and reflection  did but render the ultimate outcome the more certain.      The feeling of experiment and uncertainty  was not confined to the North.  At first  neither side expected an actual conflict of arms,— perhaps neither side  expected a permanent dissolution of the Union.  There was a strong party of opposition to secession in the South,  notably in Georgia,  where  even  Mr. Stephens,  now Vice-President of the Confederacy,  had opposed it.  Secession had been  in some sense  a movement of political leaders  rather than  of the people.  The object was  to make terms with the North  about slavery,  and they thought that  probably better terms could be made  out of the Union  than in it.  The States which followed South Carolina  felt bound to support their sister State  in demands  with which they sympathized.  Border States  like North Carolina and Virginia and Tennessee  held off  only until coercion  should be attempted.  Compromise was hoped for,  even confidently expected.   Some dreamed,  in the North  as well as in the South,  that the dissolution would be final  and peaceful!  Action was hurried forward  too rapidly  to be based upon careful calculation  or any wise forecast. (Page  210)       Secession  and  Civil  War. 103.   Secession  (1861—1861) .      South Carolina,  alone among the States,  still chose her presidential electors,  not by popular vote,  but through her legislature.  After having chosen Breckinridge electors,  Nov. 6, 1860,  her legislature remained in session  to learn the result of the election.  The governor of the State had consulted other southern governors  upon the course to be taken in the event of a Republican victory,  and had received answers  which encouraged South Carolina  to expect support,  should she determine to secede.  When news came that Lincoln was elected,  therefore,  the South Carolina legislature called a state convention,  made provision for the purchase of arms,  and adjourned.  In Charleston,  on the 20th of December,  the convention which it had called  passed an ordinance  which repealed the action  taken in state convention  on the 23d May, 1788,  whereby the Constitution of the United States  had been ratified,  together with all subsequent  Acts of Assembly  ratifying amendments to that Constitution,  and formally pronounced  the dissolution of the union  “subsisting between South Carolina  and other States,  under the name of the  United States of America. Secession.         (Page  211)      The legal theory upon which  this startling and extraordinary series of steps was taken  was one which would hardly have been questioned  in the early years of the government,  whatever resistance  might then have been offered to its practical execution.  It  was  for  long  found  difficult  to  deny  that  a  State  could  withdraw  from  the  federal arrangement,  as  she  might  have  declined  to  enter it.  But  constitutions  are not  mere  legal documents:  they are  the skeleton frame  of  a  living organism;  and  in  this case  the  course  of  events  had  nationalized  the  government  once  deemed  confederate.  Twenty States had been added to the original thirteen  since the formation of the government,  and almost all of these  were actual creations of the federal government,  first as Territories,  then as States.  Their populations had no corporate individuality  such as had been possessed by the people of each of the colonies.  They came from all parts of the Union,  and had formed communities  which were arbitrary geographical units  rather than natural political units.  Not only that,  but north of the Missouri compromise line  the population of these new States  had been swelled by immigration from abroad;  and there had played upon the whole northern and northwestern section  those great forces of material development  which made steadily for  the unification of interests and purposes. (Page  212)       Secession  and  Civil  War. The  “West”  was the great make-weight.  It was the region  into which  the whole national force had been projected,  stretched out,  and energized,— a region,  not a section;  divided into States  by reason of a form of government,  but homogeneous,  and proceeding forth from the Union.      These are not lawyer’s facts:  they are historian’s facts.  There had been nothing  but a dim realization of them  until the war came  and awoke the national spirit  into full consciousness.  They have no bearing  upon the legal intent of the Constitution  as a document,  to be interpreted by the intention of its framers;  but they have everything to do with the Constitution  as a vehicle of  life.  The  South  had not  changed  her  ideas  from  the  first,  because  she  had not  changed  her  condition.  She  had not  experienced,  except  in  a  very slight degree,  the  economic forces  which had created the great Northwest  and nationalized  the  rest of  the  country;  for  they  had  been  shut out  from  her life  by  slavery. The  South  withdrew  from  the Union  because,  she said,  power had been given to a geographical,  a sectional, party,  ruthlessly hostile to her interests;  but  Dr. von Holst is certainly right  when he says:  “ The Union was not broken up  because sectional parties had been formed,  but sectional parties were formed  because  the Union had actually become sectionalized.”  There had been nothing active  on the part of the South  in this process.  She had stood still  while the rest of the country  had undergone profound changes;  and,  standing still,  she retained the old principles  which had once been universal.  Both  she  and  her principles,  it  turned out,  had been  caught  at last  in  the  great  national drift,  and  were  to be  overwhelmed.  Her  slender  economic resources  were  no  match  for  the  mighty strength  of  the  nation  with which  she  had  fallen  out  of  sympathy. CHAPTER I.      THE  STAGE  OF  DEVELOPMENT   (1829). (Page  12)     8.   Development  of  Parties  (1789—1824).      The federal government  was not  by intention  a democratic government.  In plan  and structure  it had been meant  to check the sweep and power of popular majorities.  The Senate,  it was believed,  would be a stronghold of conservatism,  if not of aristocracy and wealth.  The President  it was expected,  would be the choice of representative men  acting in the electoral college,  and not  of the people.  The federal Judiciary  was looked to,  with its virtually permanent membership,  to hold the entire structure of national politics  in nice balance  against all disturbing influences,  whether of popular impulse  or of  official overbearance.  Only  in the House of Representatives  were the people  to be accorded  an immediate audience  and a direct means of making their will effective  in affairs.  The government had,  in fact,  been originated  and organized upon the initiative and  primarily  in the interest of the mercantile and wealthy classes.  Originally conceived  in an effort to accommodate  commercial disputes  between the states,  it had been urged to adoption  by a minority,  under the concerted and aggressive leadership of able men  representing a ruling class.  The Fereralists  not only had  on their side  the power of convincing argument,  but also  the pressure of a strong  and intelligent class,  possessed of unity  and informed by  a conscious solidarity of material interest. Development  of  Parties.   (Page  13)      Hamilton,  not only  the chief administrative architect of the government,  but also  the author of the graver  and more lasting parts of its policy  in the critical formative period  of its infancy  had consciously  and avowedly  sought to commend it  by its measures  first of all  and principally to  the moneyed classes,— to the men of the cities,  to whom  it must look  for financial support.  That such a policy was eminently wise  there can  of course  be no question.  But it was not eminently democratic.  There can be a moneyed aristocracy,  but there cannot be  a moneyed democracy.  There were ruling classes in that day,  and it was imperatively necessary that their interest  should be  at once  and thoroughly  enlisted.  But there was a majority also,  and it was from that majority  that the nation  was to derive  its real energy and character.  During the administration of Washington and John Adams  the old federal hierarchy remained virtually intact;  the conservative,  cultivated,  propertied classes of New England and the South  practically held the government  as their own.  But with Jefferson  there came the first assertion of the force  which was to transform American politics,— the force of democracy.      So early  did these forces  form themselves for ascendancy that,  had foreign influences been shut out,  and the normal conditions of domestic politics preserved,  the Federalists  would probably have been forced from power  after the second administration of Washington,  and John Adams  would have been excluded from the presidency.  But the identification of the Democrats  with the cause of the revolutionary party in France  delayed their accession to power.  At first  sympathy with the French revolutionists  had been the predominant sentiment in America. (Page  14)         Stage  of  Development. Even Washington’s popularity was  in a marked degree  diminished by his committing the country to neutrality  when France  went to war with England.  When,  in addition to this,  he signed Jay’s treaty,  which secured commercial privileges,  indeed,  in our trade with the English,  but which gave up  unquestionable  international rights,  indignation turned to wrath;  and the man  who had been universally revered  as the saviour of his country  was freely  and most cruelly denounced as  little better than a traitor.  But the tide turned.  The commercial advantages  secured by Jay’s treaty,  proved more considerable  than had been thought  and placated  not a few  among the opposition.  The insane impudence of Genet  and the excesses of his Republican supporters  had alienated the moderate and the thoughtful.   John Adams  was elected President,  and his party  once more  gained a majority  in Congress.  France,  too,  straightway did all she could to strengthen the reaction.  By insulting and hostile measures  she brought about an actual conflict of arms  with the United States,  and Federalist ascendancy was apparently  once more  assured.      But the war spirit  thus  so suddenly and unexpectedly created in their behalf  only lured the Federalists to their own destruction.  Blinded by the ardor and self-confidence  of the moment,  they forced through congress  the arbitrary  Alien and Sedition Laws.  These laws  excited the livliest hostility and fear  throughout the country.  Virginia and Kentucky,  at the suggestion of  no less  persons than  Jefferson and Madison,  uttered their famous Resolutions.  The Federalists had added  to their original sin of  representing the moneyed and aristocratic classes,  and to their later fault of  hostility to France  and friendship for England,  the final offence of  using the powers of the federal government  to suppress freedom of speech  and trial by jury. Development  of  Parties.   (Page  15) It was a huge  and fatal blunder,  and it was never retrieved.  With the close of John Adams’s administration  the power of the Federalists  came to an end.      Jefferson was the fittest possible representative of the reaction against them.  Not only did he accept  quite completely  the abstract  French  democratic philosophy  which had proved so hot an influence in the blood of his fellow Republicans  while they sought to support the revolution in France;  he also shared  quite heartily  the jealousy  felt by the agricultural South and West  towards cities,  with their rich merchants and manufacturers,  toward the concentration of capital,  towards all  “special interests.”  Both  in dogma  and in  instinctive sympathies  he was a typical Democrat.      The future,  it turned out,  was with the Republican party.  The expansion of the country  proved to be  an expansion also  of democratic feeling  and method.  Slowly,  steadily,  the growth of new communities  went on,— communities  chiefly agricultural,  sturdily self-reliant,  strenuously aggressive,  absorbed in their own material development,  not a little jealous of the trading power  in the East.  The old Federalist party,  the party of banks,  of commercial treaties,  of conservative tradition,  was not destined to live  in a country  every day  developing a larger  “West,”  tending  some day  to be chiefly  “West.”   For,  as was to have been expected,  the political example of the new states  was altogether  and unreservedly  on the side of  unrestricted popular privilege.  In all of the original thirteen States  there were  at first  important limitations upon the suffrage.  In this point  their constitutions were not copied by the  new states;  these  from the first  made their suffrage  universal.  And their example  reacted powerfully  upon the East.  Constitutional revision  soon began in the old States,  and Constitutional revision  in every case  meant,  among other things,  an extension of the suffrage. (Page  16)         Stage  of  Development. Parties  in the East  speedily felt the change.  No longer protected by a property qualification  aristocracies  like that of New England,  where the clergy  and the lawyers  held respectable people together  in ordered party array,  went rapidly to pieces,  and popular majorities  began  everywhere  to make their weight  tell  in the conduct of affairs. 10.   The  Accession  of  Jackson  (1825—1829). (Page  20)         Stage  of  Development. In 1828  the electors  were voted for  directly  in every state,  except Delaware and South Carolina.  Jackson could claim  with sufficient plausibility  that the popular will  had  at last  been vindicated.  That the people are sovereign  had been the central dogma  of democratic thought  ever since the day of Jefferson  and the triumph  under him  of the  “Democratic-Republican”  party;  but it had not received  at the hands of that party  its full  logical  expansion  and application.  The party of Jefferson,  created by  opposition to the vigorous  centralizing measures  of the Federalists,  held  as its cardinal,  distinctive tenet  the principle that  the Constitution  should be strictly,  even literally,  construed;  that its checks and balances  should be made  and kept effective;  that the federal authorities  should learn  and observe moderation,  abstention from meddlesome activity.  But the logic  of popular sovereignty  operated under  other circumstances,  in a quite opposite direction,  as presently appeared. Development  of  Parties.   (Page  21) When,  in 1824  Jackson,  after having received a plurality of the electoral votes,  backed by what was thought to be  a virtual  popular majority,  had  nevertheless  been defeated  in the House of Representatives,  the cry of his followers  had been  that  there was a conspiracy to defeat the will of the people.  Beyond all question  the election of Adams  had been perfectly constitutional.  It could not be doubted that  the Constitution  had intended  the House  to exercise a real choice  as between the three candidates  who had received the highest number of votes  when the electors had failed  to give  to any one  a majority. The position  of the Jackson men  was plainly incompatible with  any valid interpretation of the Constitution,  most of all  with a strict  and literal  construction of it.  The plain intent of their doctrine  was that  the votes of popular majorities  should command  the action  of every department  of the government.  It meant  national  popular verdicts;  it meant nationalization.      The democracy of Jefferson  had been different.  It had entertained  very ardently  the conviction  that government must emanate from the people  and be conducted  in their interest;  but the Jeffersonians had deemed it  the essence of democracy  to confine government  to the little  home areas of local administration,  and to have  as little governing  anywhere  as possible.  It was not a theory of omnipotence  to which they held,  but a theory of method and sanction.  They could not have imagined the Jacksonian dogma,  that  anything that the people willed  was right;  that there could not be  too much omnipotence,  if only  it were the omnipotence of the mass,  the might of majorities.  They were analysts,  not absolutists. The American:  His Morals. TaxJudas.com  Isonomia.us  IPSEITY.us  LandGrab.US  Eminent Domain -  Condemnation: reduces  Private Property to a priviledge, and creates Nomads.